extent that it does not alter the allocation of resources. 20 Under this analysis, the tax system should not determine which investments are undertaken. This article will show that the exemption system would improve worldwide economic efficiency as compared to the current US system. The second contribution to the debate is the discussion of the some recent developments in economic theory which have been subsequently confirmed by empirical economy, we need to fundamentally rethink out tax code with a view to enhancing American competitiveness." 1999 TNT 50-54. 17 US TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (1992) 18 See Chorvat, note 3 supra, at 235, Vogel, note 2 supra, at 118
Unofficial Transcript of Finance Hearing on International Tax Laws
19 Harvey S. Rosen, PUBLIC FINANCE at 44-48 ( 5 th ed. 1998). 20 When taxes do not distort the placement of capital This is known as capital export neutrality. This is thought to promote economic efficiency. See Generally, Thomas Horst, "A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income." 93 Quart. J. Econ. 793 (1980) and also, Peggy Musgrave, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENT (1969) . The arguments in favor of the exemption system focus on the allocation of capital amongst MNEs. That is, the tax system should be such that investor do not have an incentive to invest in an MNE based in the United States as opposed to an MNE based in another country. Daniel Frisch The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches Tax Notes April 1992, 581, 585.The l iterature on the optimal tax system for international income is extensive. See Vogel note 2 supra at 118, as well as Richard Caves, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1996), at 190-206 The proposition that economic efficiency is achieved when taxes do not distort decisions is known as the fundamental theorem of welfare economics. For a discussion of this theorem see Rosen, note 19 supra, at 44-48.
I. Fundamental Concepts of International Taxation
Any income which arises from cross-border transactions is potentially subject to tax in two or more jurisdictions: the residence country and the source country. Under the current international tax system, 22 it is generally left to the residence country to alleviate double taxation. 23 There are two common methods of alleviating double taxation. 24 The first is the "worldwide" or "credit" method in which the residence country taxes foreign 21 David Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment 26 Journal of Public Economics 187 (1985) and Hans Werner Sinn, Taxation and the Birth of Foreign Subsidiaries in TRADE WELFARE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES ( Horst Herberg and Ngo Van Long eds., 1993 ) . A Lexis search of all law review articles reveals that the Hartman article has only been cited 5 times and never in a discussion of the efficiency of the exemption system versus the worldwide system, and the Sinn article has only been cited once, again not in a discussion of the efficiency of the exemption system versus the worldwide system. Furthermore the NFTC report, note 6 supra, cites neither of these articles. 22 Harris, note 2 supra ,at 20-30. And Reuven Avi -Yonah, Commentary to International Tax Arbitrage and the "International Tax System", 53 Tax L. Rev. 167 (2000) 23 Double taxation is highly inefficient. If foreign investment is subject to two layers of tax, while domestic investment is subject to only one, the tax system would be significantly discouraging investment in foreign countries. Caves, note 20 supra, at 90 24 An additional approach for dealing with foreign taxes is to allow them to be deducted from taxable income. This method is rarely used for income taxes. This does not eliminate double taxation, rather it simply reduces it. Both countries still tax the income. The total tax paid is higher than the tax rate in either country. Harris, note 2 supra at, 42.
source income but provides a credit for taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions. The second is the "exemption" method under which the residence country cedes all taxing jurisdiction to the source country. Section A of Part I discusses the worldwide system. Section B discusses the exemption system. Section C concludes Part I by discussing the US system which is nominally a worldwide system, but which diverges from that system in some important ways.
A. Worldwide System
The United States currently uses a form of a worldwide taxation system. 25 Under a worldwide system, a country taxes all the income of its residents, no matter where they earn it. In order to alleviate potential double taxation, the residence country generally permits its taxpayers a foreign tax credit for income taxes paid on income earned in foreign jurisdictions. Under this system, the income earned by an multinational enterprise 26 ("MNE") in a low-tax country will be taxed at least at the residence country's rates.
To illustrate, assume that A, a US MNE, earned $100 in Hong Kong and $100 in the United States. Hong Kong will tax the $100 of income earned within its borders at a rate of 17%. The United States will tax A's worldwide income of $200 at a rate of 35%. However, because of the foreign tax credit, A will only have to pay an additional US tax of $53, rather than $70. 27 Because the total amount of tax A will pay is $70, 28 the Hong Kong income and the US source income are both subject to a total tax rate of 35%, which is the rate A would have paid if all the income had been earned in the United States.
Almost all of the countries that use a worldwide system impose a limitation on the foreign tax credit. 29 The 25 Under IRC sections 1, 11, and 61, foreign source income is subject to tax. Under section 901, this income is eligible for a foreign tax credit.
26 A multinational enterprise is defined here as an enterprise that controls and manages business activities in at least two countries. See Caves, note 20 supra at 1. 27 If the Hong Kong income is earned directly by A, it will be taxable income to A under IRC section 61. If A's tax rate is 35%, A's tentative US tax will be $70 (200 X .35 ). This will be reduced by a $17 credit permitted under IRC section 901. A will then owe $53 (70-17) in US tax.
28 $53 to the United States and $17 to Hong Kong 29 For example, this is the case in the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway, see Slemrod, note 2 supra, at 92. and Ault, note 6 supra, at 388-389.
foreign tax credit limit is generally equal to the amount of residence country tax on foreign source income. 30 The foreign tax credit limit insures that the tax rate applicable to foreign source income is the higher of the residence country rate or the source country rate.
To illustrate how this occurs, assume that A also operates in Italy where the tax rate is 56%. If A earns $100 in Italy, this income will be subject to $56 of Italian tax. The Italian source income will also be subject to tax in the United States at a 35% rate, but A will receive a tax credit for the taxes paid to Italy. 31 Because the Italian rate of tax is greater than the US rate of tax, A will not pay any tax on this income in the United States. However, because the credit is limited to $35 (the amount of US tax on the Italian income), the total tax rate on this income is the higher Italian rate of 56%.
32

B. Exemption System
Under an exemption or territorial system, foreign source income generally is not subject to tax in the residence country. The residence country only taxes income earned within its borders. To illustrate, assume that N is a Dutch MNE, and N has a subsidiary in Hong Kong. N earns $100 in the Netherlands, and the subsidiary earns $100 in Hong Kong. The Netherlands has an exemption system 33 and a 35% corporate rate on income earned in the Netherlands. 34 N will pay $17 in tax to Hong Kong, and will only pay tax in the Netherlands on its Dutch source income. N will not pay any tax in the Netherlands on the Hong Kong source income. Therefore, N will have to pay less in total worldwide tax than A ( $52 for N versus $70 for A). 35 If N had an Italian subsidiary, its income would also be subject to a tax rate of 56%. 36 Thus if A and N both have operations in the same high-tax jurisdiction, A and 30 IRC § 904. For the U.K. rules see Ault, note 6 supra at 385-391. These limits prevent the worldwide system from achieving full tax neutrality between investments. Caves, note 20 supra at 191. 31 A will receive a foreign tax credit of $56, while the US tax on the income is only $35 dollars. Therefore, A will owe no further US tax.
32 Generally, if the taxpayer has foreign tax credits that it cannot use on a particular item of income, the taxpayer is permitted to use these credits to reduce US tax on other items of foreign source income. However, this is subject to many restrictions. See discussion in Section III.B infra. 36 Under a worldwide system the higher of the source country rate or the residence country rate applies. Therefore, N will be taxed alike on this income.
Most exemption systems tax the passive foreign-source income of their residents, because passive income is viewed as having no natural location. 37 For example, someone who owns shares of IBM, will obtain the same pre-tax benefits whether he resides in the United States, Bermuda or Australia. As a result an MNE will have an incentive to shift its passive income to the lowest taxed location. Because this shifting has no economic substance, 38 it is viewed as an abuse of the system, and therefore many exemption systems subject foreign source passive income to tax in the residence country.
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C. The US System
It is often said that the US international tax rules are based on a worldwide system. 40 To some extent this is true. Income earned by foreign branches 41 of US corporations is taxed when it is earned abroad. Dividends, interest, rents, royalties and similar kinds of income received by US persons are also subject US income tax. 42 In addition, income taxes paid to a foreign jurisdiction are eligible for the foreign tax credit.
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However, the US does not have a pure worldwide system. The largest deviation from the worldwide model is the taxation of income earned by foreign subsidiaries of US MNEs. If foreign source income is earned by a foreign subsidiary of the US MNE, then the income is generally not taxed until it is repatriated to the United if the tax rate in the source country is higher than in the residence country, under both a worldwide system and a territorial system, the higher source country rate applies. The principal argument against the exemption system 49 is that it would distort the decison of where to invest capital. 50 Because owners of capital will invest wherever they can receive the highest after-tax return, they 44 This complicates the determination of the effective rate of tax, see Chorvat, at note 3 supra, at 245 for a discussion of the effect of deferral. The effects of this are examined in Section III below. 45 If the foreign rate is less than the US rate This tax is equal to US tax rate minus the foreign tax rate. Caves, note 20 supra at 92 If the foreign tax rate equals or exceeds the US tax rate, there is no repatriation tax.
IRC § § 951-963
47 IRC §957(a) . A controlled foreign corporation is a foreign corporation of which more than 50% of it shares are owned by US Shareholders. A US Shareholder is defined as a US person who owns 10% or more of the voting stock of the foreign corporation. IRC § 957(b) 48 See discussion Part IV.B , infra.
49 The other major argument against an exemption system is that it would cost too much in tax revenue. This was conclusively dealt with in Grubert and Mutti, at note 10, supra at 505 , which showed that the loss of tax revenue would be rather small and might possibly result in a revenue gain.
50 Grubert and Mutti, note 10 supra at 500, and Avi -Yonah, note 10 supra, at 1353, and Robert Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, jr., and Stephen Shay, Getting Serious about the Deferral of US Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. Rev. 455 (1999) will therefore have an incentive to place investments in the lowest tax jurisdiction. The opponents of the exemption system argue that this would result in investment leaving the United States. 51 Because this incentive is created by the tax system, it is inefficient. This is sometimes known as the "runaway plant" argument, because under this analysis, if the US adopted the exemption system, many manufacturing plants currently located in the United States would be re-located to low-tax jurisdictions.
To illustrate, assume a US person A, has $1,000 to invest and has two possible investments: one in the United States and one in Country X. The US investment will give a pre-tax return of $100 while the foreign investment will give a pre-tax return of $90. In the absence of a tax on the income from these investments, A would choose the US investment, because it has a larger return. However, if the income is subject to tax in the source country (and only the source country) and the tax rate in Country X is 10% and the US tax rate is 35%, A will invest in Country X, because that investment has a higher after-tax return. 52 Because the tax system has distorted the investment decision, it has reduced worldwide production by $10 (from $100 to $90).
The opponents of the exemption system argue that the current US system prevents this distortion by insuring that the tax rate on any investment is never less than the US tax rate. 53 In the above example, if A had been subject to tax on his worldwide income at a 35% rate, A would have invested in the United States. Therefore, worldwide production would have remained at $100.
B. Economic Theory and Evidence Contradicts this Argument
The major oversight of this argument is that it neglects the fact that the US tax system generally does not tax active foreign income until it is repatriated to the United States. 59 Under an exemption system, the equation becomes r f ( 1 -t f ) = r US ( 1 -t US ), because (1-t r ) = 0. Notice however, that the equation for a worldwide system with deferral reduces to the same equation , because (1-t r ) appears on both sides of the equation.
Therefore, an MNE operating under the exemption system and a mature MNE operating under a worldwide system with deferral will have the same investment behavior. Hartman, note 21, supra at 190-195. Therefore, at equilibrium the allocation of capital between mature US MNEs 60 and foreign MNEs will be the same under the current US system and under an exemption system.
This occurs because the repatriation tax affects not only the initial decision to export capital, but also the decision to repatriate capital. Retained earnings are not immediately subject to the repatriation tax, whereas repatriated earnings are. Thus, the tax system creates incentives to retain earnings in the foreign subsidiary. By slowing down capital repatriation, more capital remains in the foreign jurisdiction. For mature subsidiaries, these two effects balance each other at equilibrium. Thus, a worldwide systems which defers the tax on foreign source income until repatriation has the same allocation of capital between US MNEs and foreign MNEs as an exemption system. 57 This assumes that tax rate in the source country is lower than the rate in the residence country. If the reverse is true, as discussed in Section I.B, supra the exemption system and the worldwide system result in the same tax rate.
58 Equilibrium occurs when the forces acting on the firm to retain earnings are balanced by the forces acting on the firm to repatriate income. Hartman, 21 supra at 188, and Sinn, note 21 supra at 327. 59 Under an exemption system, the decision to repatriate income will be based whether the capital will earn more in the United States or in the foreign country. The MNE will retain earnings in the foreign subsidiary until the point where the earnings on the marginal dollar of retained earnings are equal to the return on the marginal dollar of capital invested in the United States or mathematically r f ( 1 -t f )( 1-t r ) = r US ( 1 -t US )( 1 -t r ), where r f = pre-tax rate of return in the foreign country, t f = the tax rate in the foreign country and r US = pre-tax rate of return in the United States and t US = the US tax rate, and t r is the amount of the repatriation tax. 60 The definition of "mature" enterprise is an enterprise that is no longer in need of additional capital infusions. It is able to generate sufficient capital through its own retained earnings. Caves, note 20 supra, at 190 61 Once capital has been exported, any income this capital earns will ultimately subject to t r, the repatriation tax.
To illustrate, assume that under an exemption system A , a US MNE, would have invested $1,500 in country X, a low-tax country. However, under the worldwide system, A would only have invested $1,000, because under this system the income will eventually be subject to a repatriation tax. 62 Under the Hartman-Sinn analysis, in future years, A will have an incentive to retain earnings within the foreign subsidiary, because as long as the earnings remain in the country X they will not be subject to US tax. The incentive to retain earnings in Country X is equal to the initial disincentive to invest in Country X, so that at equilibrium, A will have $1,500 of capital invested in country X , which is the exact amount that would have been invested under the exemption system.
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The results of empirical studies agree with the predictions of this model. 64 In addition, a study by Joel
Slemrod provides additional evidence for this model. 65 That article found that the allocation of capital between high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions was not correlated with whether the parent corporation was a resident of an exemption system country or a worldwide system country. Even though this study did not involve US MNEs, it does demonstrate that in general worldwide systems with deferral generally lead to the same allocation of capital as exemption systems.
The Hartman/Sinn analysis in connection with the empirical evidence shows that the "runaway plant" argument does not apply to US MNEs because of the deferral element of the US tax system. An exemption system will not cause a flight of investment away from the United States. For mature organizations, the allocation of capital Any reinvestment decision does not depend on whether this tax is large or small. As shown in note 59, the term representing this tax (t r ) drops out of the repatriation equation. Therefore, at equilibrium, this will not affect the allocation of capital between low-tax jurisdictions and high-tax jurisdictions. by mature US MNEs between foreign and US investment is unlikely to be different under an exemption system than under the current US system.
III. The Exemption System Would Improve Economic Efficiency
While the effects of the current system are in many ways similar to those of an exemption system, this section will show how adopting an actual exemption system would be more efficient than the current US system.
First, the exemption system would reduce distortions which currently operate against immature US firms. Second, the exemption system would eliminate distortions which prevent US MNEs from acquiring foreign businesses that they otherwise would acquire. Third, it would be simpler and cheaper than the worldwide system. Fourth, it would eliminate the distortion from incentives that currently exist for certain companies to produce income abroad.
Finally, it would eliminate arbitrary distinctions between the taxation of branches and subsidiaries.
A. Worldwide System Discriminates Against Immature US Firms
One of the primary arguments is favor of the exemption system is that unlike the current system it would not discriminate against immature US MNEs. 66 The US tax system causes US MNEs a disadvantage in raising capital. 67 All other things being equal, US MNEs pay more in income tax than MNEs from exemption countries do. 68 The higher worldwide tax burden decreases the after-tax return to investors. This lower return results in a 66 For example, The NFTC (note 6, supra at 56-62) as well as Hufbauer (note 17 supra at 54-57 ) focus on the "competitiveness" of US -based MNEs. Both give some examples of how the US worldwide system hurts US MNEs in their ability to compete with foreign MNEs. They point out that the US system of its taxing multinationals is probably the most far reaching of all of the worldwide systems. That is, the US system causes more income be subject to US rates at an earlier time that any other system. 67 NFTC note 6 supra at 63. These arguments only apply to US MNEs which have a worldwide effective tax rate lower than the US tax rate. These MNEs will have to pay additional US tax on repatriation of dividends. For the US MNEs which have a tax rate greater than the US rate, the foreign tax credit will equal or exceed the US tax on the dividend and so no repatriation tax will be due. In this case the MNE will in many ways be in the same position as if it were operating under an exemption system. (For one difference and the distortion it creates see section III.C) 68 It is possible for an exemption system MNE to pay more tax than a US MNE if it earns more income in a high-tax country. Everything else being equal however, the US MNE will pay more worldwide tax than an exemption system MNE. because the tax-burden on income earned in low-tax jurisdictions will be higher for the US MNE. , 1996) . The increased cost of capital may be due to other factors as well, such as the lack of corporate integration in the United States. For a discussion of the effects of corporate integration on the cost of capital see Harris, note 2 supra at 25-35. 69 The cost of capital is defined as the pre-tax rate of return necessary to cause investors to wish to invest. Hans Werner Sinn, Taxation and the Cost of Capital: the "Old" View, the "New" View , and Another View in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY Vol.5. (David Bradford, ed. (1991) ) at 25. If the tax rate is higher, the pre-tax rate of return must also be higher to have the same after-tax rate of return.
70 NFTC , note 6 supra, at 57. After-tax return from its investments will be less than if that same MNE were based in a country which permitted an exemption. If investors will equalize the after-tax returns to equity then because the after-tax returns to equity invested in US MNEs is less, less will be invested in them.
71 This is relative to the allocation it would make if it were based in an exemption country. Even if all the countries of the world adopted the worldwide system, as long as countries have different tax rates immature US subsidiaries will be discriminated against. First, as discussed above mature US MNEs would have a lower cost of capital than immature US MNEs. Second, MNEs based in a low tax country would always have an advantage, because they can retain the benefits of income earned in low-tax countries. 84 Only if all countries were to adopt the territorial system would firms be neutral as to where the parent corporation resides.
B. US System Inefficiently Prevents US MNEs From Acquiring Foreign Businesses.
Another way in which the exemption system would be an improvement over the current system which has not been discussed to date is that the US system creates a disadvantage for US MNEs in acquiring corporations that operate in low-tax areas. Even if a US MNE and a foreign MNE would be equally efficient at operating a target corporation, ( i.e., they would have the same pre-tax rate of return) the amount a US MNE would be willing to pay for such a business will be less than what a foreign MNE would be willing to pay for it. The chart below illustrates how this occurs. If the additional tax paid to the residence country results in additional benefits to the firm, it is possible that the incentives may not be quite as clear as presented here. It would depend on the value of those benefits. See discussion in Chorvat, note 3 supra at 243-244. 85 The after-tax value for each scenario is equal to the pre-tax income minus both the local tax and the residence country tax.
Because the foreign MNE would be willing to pay $90 for the target, whereas the US MNE is only willing to pay $65, the foreign MNE will be able to outbid the US MNE. Foreign MNEs will acquire businesses that, but for the US tax system, the US MNE would have acquired. Hence, the US tax system affects resource allocation and efficiency.
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Unlike the earlier cost of capital argument, this distortion applies both to mature and immature US MNEs.
A similar argument often made by exemption system proponents is that the US system causes US MNEs to become takeover targets. 87 If the parent corporation is not subject to the US tax rules, the after-tax value of the firm would increase. Therefore, the firm is more valuable in the hands of the foreign parent than to the current shareholders. This would make the US firm a take-over target. However, the nature of the US tax rules is such that unless the foreign acquirer is willing to recognize all inherent gain in all of the foreign assets of the US firm, the foreign income of the US firm's assets will still be subject to the US tax Of course, if the US MNE can defer the residence country tax, the present value will be less than the value illustrated above. However, it will always be greater than the exemption system MNE's tax burden. The value under an exemption system of income from a subsidiary will be P (1-t f ) n where P is the pre-tax rate of return, t f is the rate of tax in the source country and n is the number of periods the income is retained abroad. Whereas under an worldwide system the value is P (1-t f ) n (1-r t ) where r t is the repatriation tax. If there is a repatriation tax ( i.e., r t > 0), (1 -r t ) will always be less than one, therefore, P(1-t f ) n will always be greater than P (1-t f ) n ( 1 -r t ). 88 IRC §367(a). These sections require recognizing all built-in gain in assets transferred to foreign corporations. This includes all goodwill and the net present discounted value of all future earnings of these subsidiaries. 89 Here we are assuming, as is likely, the foreign parent has a lower cost of capital, see discussion in Section II. 
C. US System is More Complicated and Costly Than An Exemption System
The US system of taxing international income is costly as a direct result of its complexity.
2
The US rules dealing with the foreign tax credit, and in particular the foreign tax credit limitation are very complex. 3 To a large extent this is because they are designed to prevent abusive "cross-crediting." Crosscrediting occurs when an activity generates excess foreign tax credits 4 which are then used to reduce the US tax on another item of income. 5 For example, assume a foreign investment generates a pre-tax return of $100 that is taxed at a local rate of 50%.
The taxpayer will then have $15 of excess credit. 6 If the same taxpayer also has another investment which earns $100 but is taxed at a 20% rate locally, the $15 of excess credit will offset the $15 that would be due on repatriation to the United States, and the US person would pay no US tax on this foreign source income. To some extent this behavior is desirable.
Because most worldwide systems have a foreign tax credit limit, they often cannot fully achieve neutrality between investing in the United States and abroad. However, if excess credits from one activity are permitted to offset US tax paid on another foreign activity, the system draws closer to neutrality. Furthermore, the calculations are multiplied because the foreign tax credit limit is applied separately to each basket.
With an exemption system much of this 9 See discussion in Section I.B of the mobility of passive income.
10 IRC § 904(d). They are 1) passive income, 2) high withholding tax income, 3) financial services income, 4) shipping income 5) dividends from non-controlled, but more than 10% owned foreign subsidiaries, 6) dividends from a domestic international sales corporation, 7) specially defined foreign trade income, 8) distributions from foreign sales corporations, and 9) all other income. The study found that foreign source income constituted 20% of the US MNEs income, but it caused 40% of their compliance costs. For European MNEs, the compliance costs for foreign source income were proportional to their percentage of overall income. system is that it causes firms to be neutral between investing in the United States and investing abroad.
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And as stated before, one of the more commonly used arguments against the exemption system is that it may encourage US MNEs to place assets outside of the United States. However, the US worldwide tax system paradoxically creates incentives for some taxpayers to place capital in foreign jurisdictions. 24 Interest and royalty payments are usually deductible from the payor's taxable income. Ault, note 6 supra at p.204. 25 Under IRC § 862(a)(1), (2),(4), these payments are classified as foreign source income. Further it is likely to be put into the general or active basket because for determining the category of income for income received from a controlled foreign corporation by a US Shareholder, then US person looks-through the payment to the underlying income of the controlled foreign corporation. IRC § 904(d)(3).
income will not be subject to tax in the foreign jurisdiction, 26 nor will it be subject to tax in the United States. Therefore, for those taxpayers who are likely to be in an excess foreign tax credit position, the US system provides an incentive to move income producing activities abroad because any income earned from these activities and paid back in interest or royalties to the United States will not be taxed in either country. 32 Under the over-all foreign loss rules ( IRC § 904(f)) and the §367 branch loss rules any foreign loss used to offset US tax, will later reduce the taxpayer's foreign tax credit limit. If the taxpayer is an excess limitation taxpayer, this won't have much effect, because the foreign tax credit limit does not affect the taxpayer's tax. 33 If the foreign loss reduces US tax on US source income, the effect of increasing US tax on foreign source income will not occur until a later year and generally the taxpayer does not pay interest on this "loan". However, under the IRC § 904(f) rules the foreign loss is allocated first against foreign-source income. Therefore, if the taxpayer has sufficient foreign source income, and is an excess credit taxpayer, the foreign loss won't actually benefit the taxpayer. Even if the United States adopted an exemption system, certain portions of the US 34 There could still be an incentive relating to the allocation of interest expense. Interest paid by a subsidiary is not allocated against US income, whereas interest paid by a branch can be. Treasury Regulation section 1.861-8 et seq. 35 Consequently, foreign taxes paid on this exempt income will no longer be credited against US income tax.
36 Taxes paid on passive income which is subject to tax in the United States will still be eligible for the foreign tax credit. Passive income the definition of passive income should include dividends are that are received from companies that the shareholder owns less than 10% of the outstanding shares. There are two important types of foreign base company income : foreign base company sales income and foreign base company services income.
Foreign base company sales income is income earned by a controlled foreign corporation from selling property which is either purchased from a related 47 Efficiency is concerned with resource allocation, not with ownership. Therefore, even though the capital is owned by the foreign MNE, it used by the US MNE.
IRC § 954
49 NFTC , note 6 supra at 1, also Massey, supra note 106, at 13. 50 Certain modifications are required however. The OECD recently called all countries both exemption systems as well as worldwide systems to adopt rules similar to the US controlled foreign corporation rules. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Controlled Foreign Corporation Legislation (OECD, 1996) 51 For a discussion of the rules that France has adopted see Ault, note 6 supra at 412-413. Under an exemption system income is taxed in the source country. The United States should exempt active foreign source business income.
However, it should not exempt passive income or income which is in fact, US source income.
Therefore, the anti-abuse rules that relate to passive income and US source income should remain in place.
Conclusion
This article has introduced some new analysis into the debate over the exemption system.
As this article has showed, the exemption system would improve economic efficiency. The exemption system would not discriminate against new businesses. It would not discriminate against US MNEs in their attempt to acquire foreign businesses.
Furthermore, it does not set up arbitrary distinctions between the taxation of foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches. The exemption system would not create the same kinds of distortions to move production offshore that the worldwide system does.
Therefore, it does not result in the kinds of economic distortions that a worldwide system must. Beyond this, the exemption system is by its nature simpler and cheaper. Finally, the main efficiency argument against the exemption system conflicts with both economic theory and empirical evidence. Therefore, 
